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Abstract
This paper investigates the secrecy performance of full duplex relay networks. The resulting analysis shows that
full duplex relay networks have better secrecy performance than half duplex relay networks, if the self-interference
can be well suppressed. We also propose a full duplex jamming relay network, in which the relay node transmits
jamming signals while receiving the data from the source. While the full duplex jamming scheme has the same
data rate as the half duplex scheme, the secrecy performance can be significantly improved, making it an attractive
scheme when the network secrecy is a primary concern. A mathematic model is developed to analyze secrecy
outage probabilities for the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming schemes, and simulation results are
also presented to verify the analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike a traditional cryptographic system [1], physical layer security is based on Shannon theory using
channel coding (rather than encryption) to achieve secure transmission [2]–[7]. Due to the broadcast
nature of wireless communications, both the intended receiver and eavesdropper may receive data from
the source. But if the capacity of the intended data transmission channel is higher than that of the
eavesdropping channel, the data can be transmitted at a rate close to the intended channel capacity so that
only the intended receiver (not the eavesdropper) can successfully decode the data. This is the principle
of physical layer security, where the level of security is quantified by the secrecy capacity which is the
capacity difference between the intended data transmission and eavesdropping channels.
It is interesting to notice that both cooperative relay and physical layer security networks relay
on wireless broadcasting. This implies that the popular cooperative networks, which have been well
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2investigated to improve transmission capacity, also provide an effective way to improve the secrecy
capacity [8], [9]. A typical relay network with an eavesdropper is shown in Fig. 1, where there is one
source node S, one relay node R, one destination node D and one eavesdropper node E.
Fig. 1. The secrecy relay network with an eavesdropper.
The purpose of physical layer security in the cooperative network is to prevent the eavesdropper from
decoding the data transmitted from S or R. This can be achieved by injecting jamming signals into the
network with the assumption that the jamming power at the eavesdropper is higher than that at the intended
destination (e.g. [10]). The jamming signal must be used with care as it may also deteriorate the intended
data transmission. This can be seen for example in [11] where beamforming is used at the destination to
reduce the negative effect of the jamming signals at the intended relay node.
Current cooperative networks usually employ half duplex relays (HDR-s) because of easy implemen-
tation. But this is at the price of 50% loss in spectral efficiency as two time slots are required to
transmit one data packet. Full duplex transmission, which was previously considered impractical due to the
associated self-interference, has attracted much attention recently due to the progress in self-interference
cancelation techniques ( [12], [13]). For example, in [14], multiple antenna were used to suppress the self-
interference; in [15], [16], a joint analog and digital cancellation technique was proposed to mitigate the
self-interference to the noise floor; in [17], two analog/RF designs were proposed which can avoid using
bulky components and/or antenna structures in most existing self-interference approaches. Of particular
interest is when the self-interference is significantly suppressed, the impact of full duplex transmission on
physical layer security. In [18] and [19], the receiver operates in full duplex mode for better secrecy because
it can simultaneously receive the data from the source and send a jamming signal to the eavesdropper.
3Alternatively, in [20], it is the eavesdropper that is equipped with the full duplex technology, so that the
eavesdropper can minimize the secrecy by receiving the data from the source and transmitting jamming
signals to the intended receiver at the same time. These approaches consider the secrecy performance of
a point-to-point full duplex system, and little work has been done for the full duplex relay network.
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of a full duplex relay network. In the full duplex
network, the eavesdropper simultaneously receives signals from the source and relay which interfere with
each other, making it harder for the eavesdropper to decode the data. This decreases the eavesdropping
capacity, and then improves the secrecy performance. Moreover, because full duplex does not suffer from
50% loss in data rate, there is no 1=2 factor in both data transmission and eavesdropping capacities, which
also leads to better secrecy performance. This will be investigated in detail later in this paper. In order to
further increase the secrecy performance, we propose a full duplex jamming relay scheme, in which the
relay simultaneously receives data from the source and sends jamming signals to the eavesdroppers. The
proposed full duplex jamming scheme has good secrecy outage performance, though its data rate is the
same as that for the half duplex scheme, making it an attractive scheme when the network secrecy is a
primary concern. The contributions of the paper are listed as follows:
 We obtain a closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability in a half duplex relay network,
for the case that the eavesdropper can intercept the data from both the source and destination. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time this has been done. In [9], the secrecy performance of a
relay selection secrecy system is analyzed, but the resulting secrecy outage probability is actually a
lower bound. This point will be further explained in Section II.
 We derive the maximum and (approximate) minimum secrecy outage probability of a full duplex
relay network, which well approximates the true secrecy outage probability. We also quantitatively
compare the secrecy performance of the half duplex and full duplex relay networks.
 We propose a full duplex jamming network and analyze its secrecy outage probability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II- IV analyze the secrecy performance
for the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming relay networks respectively; Section V gives
numerical simulations to verify the analysis; finally, Section VI summarizes the paper.
II. HALF DUPLEX SECRECY RELAY NETWORK
In this section, we derive the secrecy outage probability of the half duplex secrecy network, which is
used as a baseline to compare with a full duplex scheme and the newly proposed full duplex jamming
4scheme. The system model is shown in Fig. 1, where all nodes are equipped with a single antenna, and
the eavesdropper can intercept the data from both the source S and relay R, and the relay applies the
decode-and-forward (DF) protocol. The channel coefficients for S ! R, R ! D, S ! E and R ! E
are denoted as hsr, hrd, hse and hre, respectively. We assume that all channels experience block Rayleigh
fading and that the channels remain constant over one block but vary independently from one block to
another. The corresponding channel gains, obtained as j = jhjj2 (j 2 fsr; rd; se; reg), are independently
exponentially distributed with mean of j (j 2 fsr; rd; se; reg) respectively. The noise at nodes R, D and
E are denoted as nr(t), nd(t) and ne(t) with variances of 2j (j 2 fr; d; eg) respectively. The transmission
powers at S and R are Es and Er respectively.
We particularly note that, in this paper, we assume S and D are well separated so that there is no
effective direct S ! D transmission link ( [?], [?]). On the other hand, if the direct S ! D link exist,
the destination D receives signals from both the source S and relay R which need to be separated. In
the half-duplex scheme, this can be easily achieved by letting S and R transmit at odd and even time
slots respectively. In the full duplex scheme, other approaches are necessary for the signal separation.
For example, multiple antennas can be used to separate signals in the spatial domain and the CDMA can
be used to separate signals with different spreading codes for S and D respectively. Alternatively, the
network-coding based approaches may be applied. To be specific, we assume initially at time slot t = 1,
S transmits data s(1) to both R and D, and R has no data to transmit yet. At time t = 2, S and R
transmit data s(2) and s(1) to D respectively. Then at the destination D, s(1) and s(2) can be separated
by subtracting the previously received s(1) (at time t = 1) from the current received signal (at time t = 2).
Continue this process until all data are transmitted. This is similar to the two-path transmission in [?,?].
The detail of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and will be left as an interesting topic for future
study.
A. Secrecy capacity
We assume at time t, the source transmits xs(t) to the relay R, and the received signal at R is given
by
yr(t) =
p
Eshsr(t)xs(t) + nr(t); (1)
5and the eavesdropper E intercepts the signal from S as
ye(t) =
p
Eshse(t)xs(t) + ne(t): (2)
At time (t+1), if the relay R successfully decodes xs(t), it forwards xs(t) to D. The received signals at
D and E are given by
yd(t+ 1) =
p
Erhrd(t+ 1)xs(t) + nd(t+ 1);
ye(t+ 1) =
p
Erhre(t+ 1)xs(t) + ne(t+ 1);
(3)
respectively. For notational convenience, the time index t is ignored below unless necessary.
The secrecy capacity is defined as (see [4]),
Cs = [Ct   Ce]+; (4)
where [x]+ = max(x; 0), Ct and Ce are the capacities for data transmission and eavesdropping respectively.
Because the relay applies DF, we have
Ct = min(Csr; Crd); (5)
where Csr and Crd are the channel capacities for S ! R and R! D respectively. In order to concentrate
on the secrecy performance of the network, we assume the channel SNR is high enough so that the relay
and destination nodes can always decode the data. Then we have
Csr =
1
2
log2(1 +
Esjhsrj2
2r
) ' 1
2
log2(sr);
Crd =
1
2
log2(1 +
Erjhrdj2
2d
) ' 1
2
log2(rd);
(6)
where we assume without losing generality that Er = Es = 1 and 2r = 
2
d = 1, so that the channel gains
sr and rd become the channel SNRs for S ! R and R! D respectively1. Similar assumption is used
in the rest of the paper.
Substituting (6) into (5) gives
Ct = min

1
2
log2(sr);
1
2
log2(rd)

: (7)
On the other hand, because the eavesdropper receives the data xs(t) twice, from S and R at time t and
1The transmission and noise powers can always be normalized to unity by “absorbing” into the corresponding channel SNR.
6(t+ 1) respectively, the eavesdropping capacity is obtained as
Ce =
1
2
log2

1 +
Esjhsej2 + Erjhrej2
2r

' 1
2
log2(se + re); (8)
where se and re are the channel SNRs for S ! E and R! E respectively. Note that the “1=2” factor
in (7) and (8) are due to the half duplex transmission at the relay node.
Substituting (7) and (8) into (4) gives the secrecy capacity of the half duplex scheme as
CHDR =

1
2
log2(min(sr; rd)) 
1
2
log2(se + re)
+
=

1
2
log2

min(sr; rd)
se + re
+
: (9)
B. Secrecy outage probability
From (9), the secrecy outage probability for the half duplex relay scheme is given by
PHDR = P (CHDR < Rs) = P

min(sr; rd)
se + re
< 22Rs

; (10)
where Rs is the target secrecy rate. Note that, because Rs  0, we have P ([x]+ < Rs) = P (x < Rs) so
that the operator [:]+ can be removed in (10).
Letting X = min (sr; rd), Y = se + re and Z = X=Y , (10) becomes
PHDR = FZ(2
2Rs) =
Z 1
0
FX(2
2Rsy)fY (y)dy; (11)
where F (:) and f(:) are the cumulative density function (CDF) and probability-density-function (PDF)
respectively.
The CDF of X can be obtained as
FX(x) = 1  e 
x(sr+rd)
srrd ; (12)
and the PDF of Y is given by
fY (y) =
8<:
ye y=se
2se
; se = re
ey=re e y=se
se re e
  y(se+re)
sere ; se 6= re
(13)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (11) gives the secrecy outage probability of the half duplex secrecy network
as
PHDR =
22Rssere(sr + rd)
2 + (2rdsr + rd
2
sr)(re + se)
24Rssere(sr + rd)2 + 22Rs(2rdsr + rd
2
sr)(re + se) + 
2
sr
2
rd
: (14)
7Before we leave this section, it is interesting to point out that, while the eavesdropper listens to S and
R at time t and (t + 1) for the same data xs(t) respectively, it can be easily assumed that the secrecy
outage probability is the probability that eavesdropper can decode xs(t) from either S or D. This is
however not correct as the eavesdropper will combine the data from S and D together before it decodes
the data. Similar mistake unfortunately still appears in some recent publications (e.g. in [21] though it is
for the secrecy outage in a relay selection cognitive radio network). Alternatively in [9], the eavesdropping
capacity of a relay selection secrecy system is obtained by taking the maximum gain of the S ! E and
R ! E channels, which is smaller than the true eavesdropping capacity. And thus the resulting secrecy
outage probability is in fact a lower bound.
III. FULL DUPLEX SECRECY RELAY NETWORK
A. System model
The system model of a full duplex secrecy relay network can also be shown in Fig. 1, except that the
relay is now equipped with two antennas for receiving and transmission respectively. We assume that,
at time slot t, the source S transmits xs(t) to the relay R. The relay R receives data from S with its
receiving antenna, and at the same time uses its transmission antenna to transmit the previously decoded
signal xs(t 1) to the destination. Because R receives and transmits simultaneously, when R is receiving,
it is interfered by its own transmission which is called self-interference. Then the received signal at R is
given by
yr(t) =
p
Eshsr(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhrr(t)xs(t  1) + nr(t); (15)
where hrr(t) is the residual self-interference after the self-interference cancellation. It is often assumed
that the self-interference can be significantly suppressed2 (e.g. [12], [22]) so that hrr(t) can be regarded
as an independent Rayleigh distributed variable (e.g. [23], [24]). The received signal at the destination D
is similar to that in the half duplex scheme which is given by
yd(t) =
p
Erhrd(t)xs(t  1) + nd(t): (16)
Because now the source and relay transmit simultaneously, at time t, the received signal at the
2Self-interference cancellation algorithms are beyond the scope of this paper.
8eavesdropper is given by
ye(t) =
p
Eshse(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhre(t)xs(t  1) + ne(t): (17)
It is interesting to observe that (17) is similar to the intersymbol interference (ISI) channel, and thus the
eavesdropping capacity is expected to be lower than that in the half duplex scheme. Assuming there are
B data packets per block, and stacking the received signals at the eavesdropper for all B data in one
block, (17) can be expressed in a matrix/vector form as
ye = Hxs + ne; (18)
where ye = (ye[B + 1];    ; ye[1])T, xs = (xs[B];    ; xs[1])T and ne = (ne[B + 1];    ; ne[1])T, and H is
the eavesdropping channel matrix which is given by
H =
266666666666664
p
Erhre
p
Eshse
p
Erhre
p
Eshse
p
Erhre
. . .
p
Eshse
p
Erhre
p
Eshse
377777777777775
(B+1)B;
(19)
and T denotes the transpose operator.
B. Secrecy capacity
From (15), the channel capacity for S ! R is given by
Csr = log2

1 +
Esjhsrj2
Erjhrrj2 + 2r

' log2

sr
rr + 1

; (20)
where the approximation holds over the high SNR range, and similar to (6) the transmission and noise
powers are normalized to unity, so that rr and rr are the channel gains for the S ! R and self-
interference channels, respectively. Because we assume self-interference can be significantly suppressed,
when the SNR is sufficiently high, we have sr  (rr + 1) so that the approximation in (20) holds.
The channel capacity for R! D is similar to that in the half duplex scheme (as is shown in (6)) but
without the “1=2” factor due to the full duplex transmission. Then from (5), the transmission capacity of
9the full duplex scheme is given by
Ct = log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

: (21)
On the other hand, from (18), the eavesdropping capacity can be obtained as
Ce =
1
B
log2 detfI+HHHg; (22)
where det(:) and (:)H denote the matrix determinant and Hermitian transpose respectively.
Substituting (21) and (22) into (4) gives the secrecy capacity for the full duplex network
CFDR =

log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

  log2

(detfI+HHHg) 1B
+
: (23)
C. Eavesdropping capacity
Below we further investigate the eavesdropping capacity Ce. From the eigen-decomposition of HHH,
(22) can be reformed as
Ce =
1
B
log2
BY
b=1
(1 + b); (24)
where b is the bth eigenvalue of HHH. Because H is a Toeplitz matrix, b is given by (see [25])
b = (jhsej2 + jhrej2) + 2jhsehrejcos
b
B + 1
; b 2 f1; 2; :::; Bg: (25)
Substituting (25) into (24) gives
Ce = log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

+
1
B
BX
b=1
log2
 
1 +
2jhsehrejcos bB+1
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2
!
: (26)
Because 2jhsehrejcos bB+1  2jhsehrej  jhsej2 + jhrej2 < jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1, we have 2jhsehrejcos bB+1jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1
  1: (27)
For simplicity, we let u = (2jhsehrejcos bB+1)=(jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1). Then using a Taylor expansion, we
have
1
B
BX
b=1
log2(1 + u) =
1
B
BX
b=1
1
ln 2

u  1
2
u2 +
1
3
u3   1
4
u4 +   

=
1
ln 2
 1
B
 
BX
b=1
u 
BX
b=1
1
2
u2 +
BX
b=1
1
3
u3  
BX
b=1
1
4
u4 +   
!
:
(28)
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It is interesting to note that
PB
b=1 u
k = 0 if k is odd. Thus the odd exponents in (28) are all zeros, so
that we have
1
B
BX
b=1
log2(1 + u) =  
1
ln 2
 1
B
 
BX
b=1
1
2
u2 +
BX
b=1
1
4
u4 +   
!
 0; (29)
where the equality holds for jhsej = 0 or jhrej = 0. Letting Ce =  1=B
PB
b=1 log2(1 + u), and from
(26) and (29), we have
Ce = log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2
 Ce  log2  1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2 : (30)
This implies that, except for the “1=2” factor, the eavesdropping capacity of the full duplex scheme is
smaller than that of the half duplex scheme, unless either the S ! E or R ! E eavesdropping channel
gain is zero. This is not surprising because in the full duplex scheme, the simultaneous transmission from
S and R interfere with each at the eavesdropper. Below we further show how much such interference (or
Ce) affects the eavesdropping capacity.
Ignoring the high order terms in (29), we have
Ce =  
1
B
BX
b=1
log2(1 + u) 
1
2 ln 2
 1
B
BX
b=1
1
2
u2
=
1
2 ln 2
 1
B


2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1
2 BX
b=1
cos2
b
B + 1
=
1
2 ln 2


1
2
+
1
2B



2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1
2
:
(31)
Further noting that
2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1 <
2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2  1; (32)
where equality holds jhsej = jhrej, then the maximum Ce is approximately given by
Ce;max =
1
2 ln 2


1
2
+
1
2B

 1
4 ln 2
; (33)
where the approximation holds for large block size B.
Substituting (33) into (30), we have the minimum eavesdropping capacity which is approximately given
by
Ce;min  log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2
  1
4 ln 2
: (34)
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Recalling that Ce  0, it is clear from (30) that the maximum eavesdropping capacity is given by
Ce;max = log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

; (35)
which is achieved when Ce = 0, or jhsej = 0 or jhrej = 0.
From the above analysis we conclude that, when either the S ! E or R! E eavesdropping channels
is weak (either jhsej or jhrej is close to zero), the eavesdropping capacity is close to its maximum value
which is given by (35). When the S ! E and R ! E channels have similar gains (jhsej  jhrej), the
receiving eavesdropper is most severely interfered with and the eavesdropping capacity is close to its
minimum given by (34).
On the other hand, Ce;max and Ce;min only differ by approximately 1=(4 ln 2), which is a constant.
When either of the eavesdropping channels is strong enough, i.e. either jhsej2 or jhrej2 is large such that
log2 (1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2) 1=(4 ln 2), we have Ce  log2 (1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2). This leads to an interesting
result: the interference at the eavesdropper from the simultaneous transmission at S and R has limited
effect on the eavesdropping capacity especially for strong eavesdropping channels.
D. Secrecy outage probability
From (23) and (30), the secrecy outage probability of the full duplex scheme can be obtained as
PFDR = P (CFDR < Rs)
= P

log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

   log2  1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2 Ce < Rs
 P

log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

   log2  jhsej2 + jhrej2 Ce < Rs ;
(36)
where the approximation holds at high SNR. While it is hard to obtain a closed form for (36) due to
the presence of Ce , we can obtain the minimum and maximum of the secrecy outage probability which
gives very good approximation to the true value.
When Ce = 0, we have the maximum secrecy outage probability, or the upper bound of PFDR, as
PFDR;max = P

XF
Y
< 2Rs

= FZ(2
Rs) =
Z 1
0
FXF (yf )fY (y)dy;
(37)
where XF = min

sr
rr+1
; rd

, Y = jhsej2 + jhrej2 and Z = X=Y .
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The PDF of Y , fY (y), is the same as that in the half duplex scheme which is given by (13). The CDF
of XF can be obtained as
FXF (x) = 1 
sre
 x(sr+rd)
srrd
sr + rrx
: (38)
Substituting (13) and (38) into (37) gives the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability as
PFDR;max = FZ(2
Rs)
=
8<:
[23Rsrd3se
2
rr+2
2Rsrd
2
sesr
2
rr+2
3Rssr
3
se
2
rr rdse2srrr2Rs+enEi(1;n)(rdse2sr2Rs+se3sr2Rs+rd3sr)]
2se
2
rr2
2Rs (2Rsrdse+2Rssesr+rdsr)
; se = re
1
(se re)2Rsrr

2Rsrr(se   re) + sr(emEi(1;m)  enEi(1; n))

; se 6= re
(39)
where m = 2
Rsrdre+2
Rsresr+rdsr
2Rsrdrerr
, n = 2
Rsrdse+2
Rssesr+rdsr
2Rsrdserr
, and Ei() is the exponential integral
function, that is, Ei(a; b) =
R1
1
e xbx adx.
On the other hand, when Ce = Ce;max  1=(4 ln 2) as is shown in (33), we obtain the approximate
minimum secrecy outage probability as
PFDR;min = FZ(2
Rs Ce;max)  FZ(2Rs  14 ln 2 ): (40)
We note that (40) is not a strict lower bound of PFDR, but it gives accurate approximation of the best
secrecy performance of the full duplex scheme. This is because of the Tayler series approximation used
in (31).
E. Discussion
Compared with the half duplex scheme, there are several factors that affect the secrecy capacity of the
full duplex relay. The first is that the full duplex scheme has no “1=2” factor in both the transmission
and eavesdropping capacities. This is equivalent to halving the target secrecy rate, which leads to higher
secrecy capacity according to the definition of the secrecy capacity.
The second factor is the simultaneous transmission of the source and relay nodes in the full duplex
transmission. The influence of the simultaneous transmission on the eavesdropping capacity has been
analyzed in Section III-C. From the analysis, we know that the simultaneous transmission in the full
duplex scheme does help to improve the secrecy capacity, but the influence is limited. The most influence
occurs when the S ! E and R ! E eavesdropping channels have the same gains, which leads to
decreasing the target rate by 1=(4 ln 2) as is shown in (40). The least influence applies when either of the
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eavesdropping channels is zero.
The third factor that influences the secrecy performance is the self-interference at the relay due to the
full duplex transmission. It is clearly shown in (20) that the self-interference channel rr decreases the
channel capacities for S ! R, which deteriorates the secrecy capacity of the full duplex scheme. The
impact of the self-interference on the secrecy capacity will be investigated in the simulation section.
In summary, for the full duplex network, the first and second factors improve the secrecy performance,
and the third factor deteriorates the secrecy performance. Because the second factor (the simultaneous
transmission) has no significant effect on the secrecy performance, the secrecy performance advantage of
the full duplex over the half duplex scheme mainly comes from the “1=2” factor in the capacities, if the
self-interference can be sufficiently suppressed as it can in many systems.
IV. FULL DUPLEX JAMMING RELAY NETWORK
A. Secrecy capacity
This section proposes a full duplex jamming relay network. The system model is the similar to that of
the full duplex scheme, but the relay R now switches between full and half duplex operation. At time slot
t, the relay works in full duplex mode: the source S transmits data xs(t) to R, R receives and decodes
xs(t) from S. At the same time, R transmits the jamming signal jr(t) to the eavesdropper E. Then the
received signals at R and E at time t are given by
yr(t) =
p
Eshsr(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhrr(t)jr(t) + nr(t);
ye(t) =
p
Eshse(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhre(t)jr(t) + ne(t);
(41)
respectively. At time (t+1), the relay R works in the half duplex mode that it only transmits the previously
decoded xs(t) to the destination, and switches off its receiving antenna. At the same time, the source S
transmits the jamming signal js(t+1) to the eavesdropper. Then at time (t+1), the eavesdropper receives
the following signal
ye(t+ 1) =
p
Erhre(t+ 1)xs(t) +
p
Eshse(t+ 1)js(t+ 1) + ne(t+ 1): (42)
Because we assume no direct link between S and D, the jamming signal js(t+1) has no effect on D so
that the received signal at D is the same as that for the half duplex scheme which is shown in (3). Then
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the transmission capacity can be obtained as
Ct =
1
2
log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

: (43)
Comparing (21) and (43) shows that the full duplex and full duplex jamming schemes have similar data
transmission capacity, except there is a “1=2” factor in the capacity of the latter. This is because the data
rate of the full duplex jamming scheme is the same as that of the half duplex scheme.
On the other hand, from (41) and (42), the eavesdropping capacity Cs is given by
Ce =
1
2
log2

1 +
se
re
+
re
se

: (44)
Substituting (43) and (44) into (4) gives the secrecy capacity for the full duplex jamming scheme at
the high SNR region as
CFDJ =

1
2
log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

  1
2
log2

1 +
se
re
+
re
se
+
: (45)
B. Secrecy outage probability
Letting X = min

sr
rr+1
; rd

, Y = se
re
+ re
se
and Z = X=(1 + Y ), the the secrecy outage probability
is obtained as
PFDJ = P (CFDJ < Rs) = P

X
1 + Y
< 22Rs

= FZ(2
2Rs) =
Z 1
0
Z 22Rs (1+y)
0
fX(x)fY (y)dxdy:
(46)
Next we calculate the PDF of X and Y to derive (46). First, taking the derivative of the CDF of X
(which is shown in (38)) gives the PDF of X as
fX(x) =
e
  (sr+rd)x
srrd [(rd + sr)(rrx+ sr) + srrr]
(rrx+ sr)2rd
: (47)
Then the PDF of Y , fY (y), can be obtained as
2M3ln

[M+y][My+1]
M

(M2 +My2 +M + 1) +My(M6 + 2M5y +M4y2 +M4 + 2M3y +M2y2 +M2 + 2My + 1)
(M7 + 4M6y + 6M5y2 + 4M4y3 +M3y4 + 3M5 + 9M4y + 9M3y2 + 3M2y3 + 3M3 + 6M2y + 3My2 +M + y)(My + 1)
;
(48)
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where M = se=re. Substituting (47) and (48) into (46) gives
PFDJ =
Z 1
0
fY (y)
241  sre  2Rs (sr+rd)(y+1)srrd
2Rsrry + 2Rsrr + sr
35 dy: (49)
While (49) is in an integral close form, it can be easily obtained numerically with, for example Matlab
or Maple [26].
C. Discussion
In either the full duplex or full duplex jamming scheme, the eavesdropper receives signals from both
source and relay simultaneously. In the full duplex scheme, both received signals at the eavesdropper are
the data so that they can be jointly decoded, leading to the similar eavesdropping capacity to that for the
half duplex scheme (except the “1=2” factor). This has been clearly shown in Section III. While in the
jamming scheme, the eavesdropper always receives data from one node and jamming signal from another
node. The jamming signals impose serious interference to the data decoding at the eavesdropper, resulting
in significant decrease in the eavesdropping capacity.
On the other hand, for the data transmission, the jamming scheme is still “half duplex” so that there is a
“1=2” factor in its data and eavesdropping capacities. The “1=2” factor, which is equivalent to doubling the
secrecy rate compared with the full duplex scheme, deteriorates the secrecy performance in the jamming
scheme. It is clear from the definition of the secrecy capacity that such deterioration is more serious
for higher target secrecy rate. This leads to an interesting observation: when the target secrecy rate is
small, the influence from the “1=2” factor is also small, so that the jamming scheme has significant better
secrecy performance than the full duplex scheme. But when the target secrecy rate becomes higher, the
secrecy difference between the jamming and full duplex scheme becomes smaller. In fact, when the target
secrecy rate is high enough, the full duplex scheme may have better secrecy performance than the jamming
scheme. These will be very well verified by the simulation in the next section.
We also note that, while the secrecy outage analysis in this paper is for the relay network without a
S ! D direct link, the described half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming schemes can be readily
applied in the network with a S ! D direct link. On the other hand, including the S ! D direct link
complicates the performance analysis without gaining more insight into the half-/full- duplex relay which
is the main focus of this paper. Finally we would like to point out that, while the secrecy performance
analysis in this paper is based on the knowledge of the channel-state-information (CSI) for all channels
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(including the eavesdropping channels), the implementation of the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex
jamming schemes do not rely upon the CSI knowledge.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, simulation results are given to verify the above analysis, where “HDR”, “FDR” and
“FDJ” represent the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming schemes in following figures. In the
simulations, the noise variances 2r , 
2
d and 
2
e and the source and relay transmission powers Es and Er
are all normalized to unity, and the block size B = 1000. The simulation results are obtained by averaging
over 100; 000 independent runs.
Fig. 2 verifies the secrecy outage analysis of the full duplex scheme in Section III-D, where we let
rr = 0 dB and sr = rd = 40 dB; the theoretical maximum and minimum of the secrecy outage
probability are obtained by (39) and (40) respectively. In is clearly shown that, when the S ! E and
R ! E eavesdropping channels have similar gains (se = re = 15 dB), the secrecy outage probability
is close to the minimum value. While when one of the eavesdropping channels is weak (se = 25 dB
and re = 10 dB), the secrecy outage probability is close to the upper bound. In any case, the difference
between the maximum and minimum secrecy outage probabilities are not significant. This verifies the
analysis in Section III-D. In following simulations, only the simulation results for the full duplex scheme
are shown for better exposition.
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Fig. 2. Theoretical vs numerical secrecy outage probabilities for full duplex relay scenario for sr = rd = 40 dB, rr = 0 dB.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probability vs data transmission SNR for HDR, FDR and FDJ, where
we let sr = rd, rr = 0 dB and se = re = 10 dB. Both the simulation and theoretical results for the half
duplex and full duplex jamming schemes are presented, which are shown to be well matched. This verifies
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probabilities vs channel SNR for HDR, FDR and FDJ schemes, where sr = rd, se = re = 10 dB
and rr = 0 dB.
the closed-form secrecy outage probabilities for the half duplex and jamming schemes which are given by
(14) and (49) respectively. It is shown in Fig. 3 that, when the target secrecy rate is small (Rs = 1), the
jamming scheme has better secrecy performance than the full duplex scheme. But when the target secrecy
rate is large (Rs = 2), the jamming scheme has slightly worse secrecy outage performance than the full
duplex scheme. In all cases, the half duplex has the worst secrecy performance. These observations are
exactly what we expected in Section IV-C.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probabilities vs target secrecy rate for FDR, FDJ and HDR schemes, where sr = rd = 40 dB and
rr = 0 dB.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability vs target secrecy rate for half duplex, full duplex and
jamming schemes, where we let sr = rd = 40 dB and rr = 0 dB. It is shown that, for se = re = 20
dB, when the target secrecy rate is small enough (RS < 4:7), the jamming scheme has better secrecy
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outage performance than the full duplex scheme. This is because the interference from jamming has more
influence on the secrecy performance than the “1/2” factor. When the target rate becomes higher, the “1=2”
factor in the capacities of the jamming scheme starts to have more influence on the secrecy performance.
Until the target rate RS > 4:7, the jamming scheme has higher secrecy outage probability than the full
duplex scheme. On the other hand, when se = re = 10 dB, the jamming has less influence on the
secrecy performance than that for se = re = 20 dB. As a result, only when RS < 1:7, the jamming
scheme has better secrecy outage than the full duplex scheme. Otherwise, it is the full duplex scheme
that has lower secrecy outage probability. This simulation further verifies the analysis in Section IV-C
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy performance vs residual self-interference rr for different approaches, where
we let sr = rd = 40 dB and se = re = 10 dB. It is clearly shown that, when the secrecy target Rs = 2,
the full duplex has better performance than the half duplex scheme when rr < 9 dB. But when Rs = 1,
the full duplex has better performance than the half duplex scheme only when rr < 5 dB. This is what
we expected, because the main reason for the full duplex scheme to have better secrecy performance
than the half duplex scheme is the associated “1=2” factor in the capacities, whose impact on the secrecy
performance goes up with higher data rate. It is also shown in Fig. 5 that, when Rs = 1, the jamming
scheme has better performance than the full duplex scheme. And when Rs = 2, the jamming scheme has
slightly worse performance than the full duplex scheme. The reason is the same as that in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probabilities vs residual self-interference 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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the secrecy performance of a full duplex relay network and proposed the
full duplex jamming scheme to further improve the secrecy performance. The secrecy outage probability
of the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming schemes have been analyzed. The analysis shows
that, the full duplex scheme has better secrecy performance than the half duplex scheme. On the other
hand, the proposed full duplex jamming scheme has better secrecy performance than the full duplex
scheme for small target secrecy rate, and the improvement may disappear when the target rate becomes
large. The secrecy improvement of the full duplex jamming scheme is at the price of data rate lose.
Numerical examples have been given to verify the analysis.
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